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Gendering the Declaration 
FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN* 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights undergoes timely 
review with each decade milestone.  At its fortieth, fiftieth, and now 
sixtieth passing,1 we continue to inquire about its influence, its 
heightened or diminished significance, and the manner in which its 
vision might be better implemented.  With each decade we gain a 
greater appreciation of the breadth of vision imagined in its language, 
the continuing validity of its ambition, and the multiple ways in 
which meaningful enforcement of those ideals falls short.  Over the 
years, greater attention has been focused on the ways in which the 
Universal Declaration has advanced claims for gender equality.  As 
the document‟s influence and status has magnified, its gendered 
boundaries are in plainer sight.  Moreover, as feminists have 
systematically exposed the entrenched biases of international law, the 
Universal Declaration does not emerge from scrutiny unscathed.   
This article focuses primarily on the enduring impact of gender 
inclusions and exclusions in the drafting of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.  Examining the Declaration‟s drafting history 
reveals the character and form of gender as it is included in the 
document and the long-term effects on the normative character of 
human rights law.  Following in the footsteps of other feminist inter-
national scholars,2 the article suggests that foundational documents 
 
* Dorsey & Whitney Chair in Law, University of Minnesota Law School, and  Professor of 
Law and Director, Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland.  My 
thanks to Amanda Lyons for research assistance.  All errors remain with the author. 
1. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781 (1998); Tracy E. Higgins, Regarding Rights: An 
Essay Honoring the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 30 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 225 (1998). 
2. Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to 
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matter to the construction of gender relations in ways that are 
difficult to dislodge, and create conceptual pathways that can 
substantially limit theoretically open-ended visions of international 
human rights law.  Thus, advancements typified as achievements in 
their time may carry greater long-term baggage with them than we 
perceive.  I suggest that a more quizzical view of the gains made for 
women in the Universal Declaration might contribute to the broader 
project of defining gender dignity, violation, and accountability in 
ways that consistently reflect and respond to the experiences and 
needs of women.  This approach would replace the currently domin-
ant accommodationalist model which tries to “fit” the experiences of 
women into an existing and constrained framework. 
It is conventional wisdom that the Universal Declaration, or large 
portions of it, constitutes customary international law.  There is wide-
spread agreement that the Declaration is a foundational document, 
that its influence has been and remains extraordinary, both domes-
tically and internationally, and that it captures the best of state 
sentiments with regard to human rights.  There is little disagreement 
that the Universal Declaration is a good thing.  Generally, arguing 
against the Universal Declaration is not a winner.  Nonetheless, 
skepticism has merit, and the start of the skeptical road takes us back 
to the committee rooms in which the dealing was done.   
I. THE LANGUAGE OF SEX 
In the opening paragraph of the United Nations Charter, states say 
they are determined to “reaffirm [their] faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women.”  This is further supported by a specific 
reference to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.3  In 
institutional terms, structural commitments to addressing gender 
discrimination followed when the Economic and Social Council 
established a Sub-Commission on the Status of Women to “submit 
proposals, recommendations, and reports to the Commission on 
 
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT‟L L. 613 (1991) [hereinafter Charlesworth et al., Feminist 
Approaches]; Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 63 (1993); Judith Gardam, A Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of International 
Humanitarian Law, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. Int‟l L. 265 (1992). 
3.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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Human Rights . . . .”4  Both Commissions, as we know, played a 
pivotal role in the adoption of the Universal Declaration in the post-
war period.5   
Some assessments of the Universal Declaration laud its lack of 
sexism, manifested in the repetition of specific phrases such as “all,” 
“everyone,” and “no-one.”6  Others are more circumspect.  Ada-
mantia Pollis has argued that the Declaration is informed by “[t]he 
notion of man as an autonomous, rational, calculated being . . . a 
notion of man but not of woman, and not even of all men but only of 
some.”7  If we take seriously the claim that “[t]he structure of the 
international legal order reflects a male perspective and ensures its 
continued dominance,”8 then paying close attention to the words that 
implicate social structures is particularly important.  In this view, a 
nod to non-discrimination may not be sufficient to name and fully 
reveal the multiple ways in which women experience discrimination 
and exclusion.  What the drafters may have understood to constitute 
impermissible discrimination arguably left intact (and endorsed) a 
social and political ordering that de facto functions to entrench the 
discriminations experienced by women.  Three particular sections of 
the Universal Declaration are given detailed consideration to under-
 
4. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm‟n on the Status of Women 
[CSW], Report of the Sub-commission on the Status of Women to the Commission on Human 
Rights, at 14, U.N. Doc. E/38/Rev.1/App.1 (May 21, 1946).  Notably under the leadership of 
Bodil Begtrup of Denmark, a swift de-coupling from the Commission followed, and the 
CSW was permitted to report directly to the ECOSOC.  Humphrey significantly described 
the CSW as having as its appointed “representatives women who were militants in their own 
countries.”  Johannes Morsink, Women’s Rights in the Universal Declaration, 13 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 229, 232 (1991) (quoting John P. Humphrey, Memoirs of John P. Humphrey: The First 
Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 387, 405 (1983)). 
5. The Commission on the Status of Women had to work hard to maintain its standing 
and to ensure its relevance to the ongoing work of the Commission on Human Rights.  A 
Special Resolution was required which invited “the officers of the Commission on the Status 
of Women to be present and participate without voting . . . when the rights of women were 
being considered.”  Morsink, supra note 4, at 231 (quoting U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.23, at 8 
(1947)). 
6. See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, 
DRAFTING AND INTENT 118 (1999).  Morsink notes that the drafters made prohibition of 
discrimination one of their few substantive drafting principles, as reflected by the repeated 
use of the words “all,” “everyone,” and “no one”: “all people and all nations” (Preamble), 
“All human beings” (Article 1), “All men and women” (Article 16), “Everyone” (Articles 2, 
3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29) and “no one” 
(Articles 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, and 18).  Id. at 129.  
7. Adamantia Pollis, Liberal, Socialist, and Third World Perspectives of Human Rights, 
in TOWARD A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 7 (Peter Schwab & Adamantia Pollis eds., 1982). 
8. Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches, supra note 2, at 621. 
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score this analysis: first, the Preamble and Article 1; second, Article 
16; and finally, Articles 23 and 25. 
II. EQUALITY, FAMILY, AND WORK 
Early drafts of Article 1 started out with the phrase “all men,” and 
there were considerable negotiations between state representatives on 
the term and what might replace it.9  The Chair of the Commission on 
the Status of Women (CSW), Bodil Begtrup, working primarily 
though not exclusively with the Russian delegation, wanted to have 
the term “human beings” substituted for that of “men.”10  Moreover, 
Begtrup sought an addition to the Declaration‟s Preamble stating that 
“when a word indicating the masculine sex is used in the following 
Bill of Rights, the provision is to be considered as applying without 
discrimination to women.”11  The proposal was not taken up, and it 
meant the CSW had no choice but to seek to protect the status of 
women article by article in the Declaration.  These debates continued 
through the First and Second Drafting Sessions, but by the time of the 
Third Session the phrase “all human beings” appeared in the draft 
document and remains.  This textual definition represents a positive 
departure and an affirmative step in confronting gender-based 
discrimination in the document.  But, its success was only partial. 
The drafting history of Article 16 (concerning marriage and the 
family) was torturous.12  The debates here concerned the status of the 
family.  The final version of Article 16(3) proclaims the family as 
“the natural and fundamental unit of society.”  Moreover, a crucial 
issue throughout the debates was whether the provision should 
contain reference to the equality of rights and status in the dissolution 
of marriage.  The matter of marriage status and the disadvantage 
experienced by women in multiple jurisdictions was a particular 
preoccupation of the CSW, but its ability to radically influence the 
final configuration was limited.  The article ultimately provides that: 
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to 
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to 
found a family.  They are entitled to equal rights as to 
 
9. MORSINK, supra note 6, at 118.  
10. The debates about terminology revolved (at least formally) around the issues of 
linguistic translation.  The historical documents reveal an interesting relationship between 
terminology, cultural practices, and political preferences. 
11. Morsink, supra note 4, at 232 (quoting U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.2/SR.2, at 2–3 (1947)). 
12. Initially Article 16 was combined with Article 6 concerning equality before the law. 
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marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses. 
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 
The emphasis on the elemental role of the family in society 
underscores the point that deep-seated biases not only lacked 
recognition in the document, but that the Declaration operated to 
encapsulate them into itself and, as a result, functioned to preserve 
the basic social structures that underpin women‟s lived inequality.  
By gaining international protection for the family unit, states affirmed 
their prerogative to seal it off from legal and social inquiry, thereby 
solidifying the distinction between private and public spheres that 
have long served to disadvantage women. 
An evident and discordant discrepancy arises in respect of Articles 
23 and 25.  Article 23 is concerned with work, freedom of employ-
ment, and pay.  In Article 23(1) the Declaration states: 
Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable 
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence 
worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by 
other means of social protection. 
Article 25 reads as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of himself and his family . . . . 
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and 
assistance. 
Both articles contain references to “himself and his family.”  The 
implication of these provisions is that women only gain their status as 
mothers and homemakers and not as persons in their own right.  The 
provisions also suggest that if there is a family wage, it is earned by a 
man.13  Historically, this notion of the “family” wage reflects thinking 
 
13. See, e.g., ALLAN C. CARLSON & PAUL T. MERO, THE NATURAL FAMILY: BULWARK OF 
LIBERTY (2008).  In this book, the authors purport to analyze what the UDHR means today.  
In so doing, they reveal that the contemporary understanding of “family wage” at the time of 
UDHR‟s drafting was a job for dad that‟s good enough to keep mom at home “in decency.”  
In studying the history of this term, they describe it as the ideal “through which the industrial 
sector could claim only one adult per family, the father, who in turn had the natural right to a 
living wage that would also sustain a mother and child at home in decency.”  Id. at 9.  They 
add that the failure of such “family wage systems” resulted from the “imposition of full 
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that converged the politics of socialists, feminists, and trade unionists 
on the demand for a “living” or “family” wage in the nineteenth 
century, for which strategic interests may have encouraged no 
challenge in the 1940s.  Moreover, it clearly ignored the radical shift 
in work patterns produced by war economics in many negotiating 
states as women adopted work functions hitherto the exclusive terrain 
of men.  It is an early example of how moments of societal trans-
formation and upheaval in which women play key roles produce 
outcomes in which women‟s separate interests are subsumed by 
national imperatives and underlying patriarchal interest.14  The lan-
guage of Article 23(2), “Everyone, without any discrimination, has 
the right to equal pay for equal work,” was a compromise for the 
women‟s lobby, which had initially sought the inclusion of specific 
terminology addressing the particular experiences of women in the 
workplace.15  
One view on the use of gender specific terminology is that the very 
active women‟s lobby simply missed these inclusions.16  Equally, this 
phrase may have gone unchallenged because it reflects and extends 
an essential and maintained division between the public and the 
private spheres.  The maintenance of this division is a crucial part of 
understanding where patriarchy remained in play throughout the 
negotiations of the Universal Declaration. 
I maintain that the Universal Declaration sustains a fundamental 
stake in preserving the public and private spheres, and that this 
foundation has had long-term influence on the construction of inter-
national law norms generally and on norms that speak to gender in 
particular.  This clear-cut distinction between public and private 
spheres, which is at the heart of the traditional notion of the state, has 
had a defining influence on international law and an identifiable 
tenacity in international legal doctrine.  International law scholars of 
the feminist hue have long articulated a notion of the way in which 
the “public-private” divide manifests itself.  As Charlesworth has 
 
„gender equality.‟”  Id. at 11. 
14. See also Christine Chinkin, Feminist Interventions into International Law, 19 
ADELAIDE L. REV. 13, 14 (1997). 
15. Interestingly, one of the reasons this terminology gets dropped is that the link 
between gender discrimination and discrimination on the basis of race is made by some 
delegates, creating a profound unwillingness by the colonial powers to engage with the 
broader issues of race, colonization, and discrimination that are implicated. 
16. Morsink, supra note 4, at 234–35. 
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noted: 
Historically, the formation of the state depended on a sexual 
division of labor and the relegation of women to a private, 
domestic, devalued sphere.  Men dominated in the public 
sphere of citizenship and political and economic life.  The state 
institutionalized the patriarchal family both as the qualification 
for citizenship and public life and also as the base socio-
economic unit.  The functions of the state were identified with 
men.17 
A number of these characteristics are evident in the articles of the 
Universal Declaration discussed here, but notably pervade Articles 23 
and 25.  They range from the strong validation of the family as the 
heart of the societal contract, to the articulation of work and wage as 
a male domain to which specific kinds of guarantees are offered, and 
to the special status offered to motherhood. 
The public-private distinction sustains women‟s oppression on a 
global level.  The most pervasive harms experienced by women tend 
to occur within the inner sanctum of the private realm, within the 
family.  As in domestic law, the non-regulation of the private realm, 
or the message that emanates from the protection of the private, 
legitimates self-regulation, which translates ultimately into male 
dominance for women.  The Universal Declaration has many pos-
itives, no doubt, but for women we need to ask with careful 
consideration: what kinds of assumptions were embedded in its 
passage; how well did it undertake the task (for women) of being a 
transformational document on their terms; and what long-term 
influence has the bedding in of these core assumptions and binaries 
had on the corpus of international legal norms as it applies to women. 
What then does this drafting history and its outcomes tell us?  In 
reflecting on the significance of the terms used, we should pay 
attention to the manner in which the term “woman” or “women” can 
be mentioned in policy-making contexts but without actually bringing 
the concept of gender into play.  As feminists have long argued, we 
need to be cautious about whether or not the use of the term actually 
does real “work” for women in legal contexts.  
 
17. Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar?  Feminist Analysis of International Law, in 
RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 9–10 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer 
ed., 1993) (footnote omitted). 
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Kaufman and Lindquist have highlighted a valuable difference 
between “gender-neutral” language and “corrective language” for the 
purposes of advancing gender equality through international legal 
norms.  Corrective language, they note, has three important advan-
tages over gender-neutral language: “(1) [I]t addresses situations that 
do not victimize men as they do women; (2) it allows for woman-
centered solution without reference to male action; and (3) it can 
prescribe active public policy to achieve fairness rather than passive 
elimination of discriminatory laws and norms.”18  Under this lens, the 
small gain in gender-neutral language advanced by the Universal 
Declaration fails to do the corrective work required to ameliorate the 
deeply grounded legal and social dispossessions experienced by 
women.  We need to be assiduously wary when rights claims (while 
certainly assisting in developing political consciousness) can be 
incorrectly assumed to solve an imbalance of power.  In practice, the 
reality is far different, and “the promise of rights is thwarted by the 
inequalities of power between men and women.”19  The articulation 
of the right can then operate, as Catherine MacKinnon has rightly 
noted, to conceal “the substantive way in which the man has become 
the measure of all things.”20 
Further, when the term “woman” is entirely absent, we should not 
assume, as many of the Universal Declaration‟s drafters did, that 
“neutral” phrases delivered gender-friendly outcomes.  In fact, the 
opposite is likely to be true.  Gender neutrality sits in a legal universe 
which is deeply masculine and will be interpreted and actualized in 
that subjective social realm.  So, neutrality is distinctly marginal in 
the dominant cultural and legal paradigms, and its capacity to bring 
into focus the experience of women in the terms on which it is 
experienced is distinctly limited.  This skepticism is one to keep to 
the fore as we reflect on the influence of the Universal Declaration on 
social and legal realities in which it is believed to have influence.21 
 
18. Natalie Hevener Kaufman & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Critiquing Gender-Neutral 
Treaty Language: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, in WOMEN‟S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PER-
SPECTIVES 114, 114–15 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995). 
19. Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches, supra note 2, at 635. 
20. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 81, 82 (Katharine T. Bartlett & 
Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991). 
21. See, e.g., Pascha Bueno Hansen, Itinerary of an Orphan Project: State and Society 
Ambivalence Toward Sexual Violence During the Internal Armed Conflicts in Peru 
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III. FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS 
Though passed by General Assembly resolution in 1948 with eight 
abstentions, there is broad agreement that the Universal Declaration 
constitutes a foundational document for the modern international 
human rights regime.  Foundational documents are relatively new 
phenomena for the international human rights movement for the 
obvious reason that the regime itself is largely a product of the post-
World War II renewal; though, many domestic legal systems have 
similar status documents (usually national constitutions or bills of 
rights).  Foundational documents are an important conceptual cate-
gory for legal systems.  They provide security and a sense of 
longitude to the norms they validate.  They perform important 
symbolic functions by giving rise to myths (and realities) of universal 
buy-in, validation by the body politic as a whole, and long-term 
legitimacy to the values they contain.  The legitimacy factor allows 
for repeat play of the document without the need for repetitious 
justification; this substantiation further affirms the validity of the 
starting point.  
There are pitfalls of course.  Foundational documents, whether 
domestic bills of rights or international declarations, are indisputably 
accompanied by gender snares.  Some do better than others.  The 
Universal Declaration makes evident attempts to engage with the 
pernicious effects of gender inequality.  Nonetheless, as the foregoing 
analysis of certain articles in the Declaration illustrates, it validates 
not only deeply problematic gender distinctions in the arena of the 
private (family) and the public (work), but its neutrality cloaks a 
deeply gendered vision of the world.  Precisely because the 
foundational document contains and elevates these damaging gender 
dimensions, an odd paradox arises.  As the political worth of the 
document has risen, and its symbolic significance has grown, it 
becomes difficult to “knock down” the Universal Declaration on the 
grounds of its gendered failings because of the broader political and 
legal investment held by the document for multiple constituencies.  
Feminists find themselves reluctant to criticize the Universal 
Declaration, wary of the costs that such adversarial engagement 
would result in, but cornered by a chorus of validation.  Con-
ceptually, the fact of foundational and touchstone status makes the 
 
(presentation at the Feminism and Legal Theory Project, Emory Law School, Sept. 19–20, 
2008) (on file with author). 
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argument a difficult one because, in many ways, the Universal 
Declaration presents a simple way to make a broader human rights 
argument.  It requires much greater dissection of the Declaration to 
reveal its gender limitations.  These “picky” arguments do better 
retail than wholesale, one consequence being that critics of the 
Declaration may experience de-legitimization or being marked out as 
hostile and out of the mainstream view of human rights when they 
offer a gendered critique.  As a result, criticism by feminists of the 
Universal Declaration has been subdued.  The quietness, I suggest, 
results from the particular confluence of the silencing that a found-
ational document can produce with the difficulty in articulating that a 
gender-neutral vision fails to deliver transformational outcomes when 
it comes to addressing the conceptual, political, and social 
perniciousness of gender discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
This view of the Universal Declaration is a pessimistic one.  It 
acknowledges a general value, but is far more circumspect as to the 
worth delivered to women as women by the Universal Declaration.  
Despite its claims of gender advancement, the Declaration left much 
work undone and may function to undercut the more radical analysis 
necessary to address the depth of discrimination, inequality, and 
exclusion experienced by women across jurisdictions and cultures.  
While much graft has been undertaken since 1948, we are far from 
advanced in the endeavor of equality, and, as Chinkin pessimistically 
noted: 
The feminist project has not been seen by international lawyers 
and decision-makers as part of the mutating international legal 
order but as essentially appertaining to women‟s rights (which 
can be sidelined along with other human rights).  Despite 
important feminist writings there has not been any radical 
change in international legal structures, sources, methodol-
ogies or substance that takes account of them.22 
So to where do we turn as we look forward from the chorus of 
celebration?  A starting point for my evaluation is the guidelines, 
specified by Kaufman and Lindquist, that probe whether international 
norms are likely to achieve gender objectives.  First they ask whether 
 
22. Chinkin, supra note 14, at 21. 
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the provisions “advance the ability of women to speak and define 
their own power in their own voices”?; secondly, whether the legal 
norm implies “that man is the measure and the standard for 
establishing appropriate, fair and reasonable behavior or treatment”?; 
and thirdly, whether there are “safeguards built in . . . to ensure that 
the provisions will not be used against women”?23  I suggest that the 
Universal Declaration may fall short on all three measures.  Some 
observers may caution against such cynicism and suggest that we 
should take what we have and work with it.  By contrast, I urge us to 
start by seeking clarity about the limitations of existing standards.  In 
the sharpness of that lucidity we will be able to identify what the 
structural barriers to gender equality are and address them in the full 
honesty revealed by the depths of the task at hand.  
 
 
23. Kaufman & Lindquist, supra note 18, at 122. 
